the same direction. Many naturalists and philosophers have argued that it is impossible to interpret the activities of such highly organized animal communities as the hive of honey-bees, or the colony of white ants with its specialized members performing their complementary functions, without the hypothesis of a collective consciousness of the community, a unitary psychical product to which all members may contribute and by which the actions of each member may be in some degree influenced and directed. This claim is, I think, valid: there are complexities of co-operation which remain utterly beyond comprehension so long as we regard the individuals as communicating only by way of signs appreciated through their sense-organs. It is true that the assumption of the collective or community consciousness does not at once solve these problems; but it does seem to offer possibilities of understanding these collective actions which, if we reject it, seem destined to remain utterly inexplicable. It is also to be remembered that a number of authors of distinction in the sphere of the social sciences have found reason to make a similar assumption for the explanation of some of the social phenomena of human life.

Now put together these two lines of evidence, and we see that they are perfectly complementary and reciprocally supporting. In this connexion the reader should remember the group of detached and separated sponge-cells which, all apparently of the same nature and rank,

come together and proceed to arrange themselves
morphogenetically and to constitute by their co-operative
activities a new living whole organism.[1]

In comparing these two rival hypotheses, we may

[1] Cf. pp. 172-3.